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Prospects for Feminism in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 
Rebecca Barlow & 
Shahram Akbarzadeh 
 
Introduction 
 
In October 2006 President Ahmadinejad called on Iranian women to return to the 
family home, and devote their energies to their ‘primary’ responsibility of raising 
children.  This was greeted by shock and indignation among large segments of Iranian 
women, revealing a wide gap between the state and significant trends in public 
opinion.  The state’s gender ideology does not correspond with the reality of Iranian 
women’s lives.  Despite the reversion to 7th century law in the aftermath of the 
Islamic Revolution, Iranian women have refused to remain confined to the walls of 
domesticity.  In astounding displays of psychological strength and endurance, they 
have managed to maintain footholds in various aspects of public life.  An expanding 
youth population and women’s high participation in tertiary education have played 
key roles in this respect. 
 
This article seeks to investigate what is at the root of the disjuncture between the 
limited range of freedoms the Islamic state is willing and/or able to provide for its 
female constituency, and the expanding range of rights-based needs of the modern 
Iranian woman.  Specifically, is this disjuncture a theological issue – that is, a result 
of the state’s misinterpretation of Islam’s holy sources – and as such can it be 
resolved vis-à-vis the convincing presentation of a more (gender) enlightened reading 
of the faith?  Alternatively, is the gap between the state’s gender ideology and 
women’s realities a result of more unremarkable politics – that is, an obstinate refusal 
on behalf of the state to accept any changes to the patriarchal status quo, regardless of 
whether proposals for change are presented within the Islamic paradigm or not?  
 
 
The Status of Women in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Regulation versus Reality 
 
In the Republic of Iran, a number of laws and regulations that explicitly discriminate 
against women on the sole basis of their gender remain integral to the state’s legal 
framework. A clear example here is the religious tradition called quessas, which is 
enshrined in Iranian law.1  Essentially, the quessas law values a woman’s life at half 
that of a man’s in murder cases. It stipulates that the amount of ‘blood-money’ 
payable to the family of a murdered woman should be half the amount that is payable 
to the family of a murdered man. Other laws in the Islamic Republic tend to reflect 
this general de-valuing of women’s lives.  For example, women’s legal testimonies 
are valued at half that of a man’s, and in some cases worth nothing unless 
corroborated by a man’s. Polygamy is legal in Iran, and divorce is lawfully the man’s 
prerogative. 
 
                                                 
1 Carol Anne Douglas et al., "Iran: Women Worth 1/2 a Man," Off Our Backs Vol. 33, no. 5/6 (2003): 
p. 5. 
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The state’s antiquated gender ideology is grounded in an entrenched culture of 
patriarchy, and reinforced (and ostensibly justified) by a patriarchal interpretation of 
Islam’s holy sources.  A cornerstone of the Islamic Republic’s gender ideology is the 
conviction that men and women are fundamentally ‘different’ beings in nature.  This 
conviction is derived from a conservative Islamic world view in which men and 
women exist, function, and relate to one another only within the limits of a ‘natural’ 
gender hierarchy.  That is, due to god-given differences – in terms of both biology and 
psychology – men and women have different roles and responsibilities in society.  In 
Iran, this has translated into a reality for women in which they occupy a subordinate 
status to men.  Iran’s conservative elite considers women to be irrational, overly 
emotional beings who are incapable of leading balanced, autonomous lives.  In their 
view, a crucial factor in the maintenance of social cohesion in Iran is men’s control 
over women.  Hence, despite the rhetoric of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, 
Iranian women are discriminated against because of their gender; they enjoy neither 
full de facto nor full de jure equality with men. 
 
It is, however, important to point out that the reality of women’s lives is much less 
restrained and limited than the state prescribes.  Iranian civil society, especially 
women’s networks, are vibrant, assertive, and unable to be fully contained by the 
antics of the Islamic state.  Iranian women have refused to be pushed out of the public 
domain or forfeit positions of responsibility to men.  Women in Iran have managed to 
maintain a foothold in the realms of politics, the media, education, and public life at 
large.  Over the past three decades the Iranian parliament (Majlis) has consistently 
included some women members.  Furthermore, the Iranian women’s press is a vibrant 
and dynamic phenomenon.  Feminist journals, such as Zanan, act as public forums for 
discussions of women’s topics that are conventionally considered taboos in Iranian 
society. Perhaps most significantly, ‘women now comprise the majority of university 
entrants’ in Iran.2  According to renowned human rights lawyer and Nobel Laureate 
Shirin Ebadi, approximately 65% of Iran’s university students are female.3  
 
Women’s advanced educations, consequent professional capacities, and consistent 
participation in public processes, have contributed to discernable assertiveness on 
their behalf. In this respect, the demographics of the country are particularly 
important. Iranian youth (defined by the United Nations as those aged between 15 and 
24 years) represent the most prominent bulge in Iran’s population pyramid.4  Young 
Iranian women and girls were not witness to the heady years of the 1979 revolution, 
and some observers have argued that religio-revolutionary ideals do not concern them 
as much as their social and economic realities.5  Young Iranian women desire a 
society that will afford them more economic opportunities, and a greater degree of 
cultural opening.  However, the Islamic state has failed to evolve its gender ideology, 
enshrined in its laws, alongside women’s changing realities. The state’s inability – or 
active unwillingness – to meet women’s increasing abilities and rising expectations 
with greater employment opportunities, more political space, and an expanded set of 
                                                 
2 United Nations Common Country Assessment for the Islamic Republic of Iran (2003 [cited August 21 
2006]); available from www.undp.org.ir/reports/CCAFINAL.pdf. 
3 Shirin Ebadi,  July 2006.  Personal communication. 
4 United Nations Common Country Assessment for the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
5 Valentine M Moghadam, "Islamic Feminism: Its Discontents and Its Prospects" (paper presented at 
the First International Congress on Islamic Feminism Barcelona, Spain, October 27-29 2005). 
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rights has created what Mahmood Monshipouri calls a ‘gender conundrum.’6  In stark 
contrast to the clear majority of Iran’s tertiary education students being female, 
women occupy only 33 percent of all professional and technical posts in Iran.7  In 
2003, the ratio of estimated female to estimated male earned income was a mere 
0.28.8  
 
What these figures indicate is the extent to which the state (along with traditional 
Muslims at the societal level) continue to conceive of the fully acceptable and 
accepted ‘Muslim woman’ as a dutiful daughter, wife, or mother, whose primary roles 
and responsibilities lie within the private realm.  This does not correspond with 
Iranian women’s conceptions of who they are, or who they aspire to be.  The 
disjuncture between conservative Islamic tradition and modern structures in Iran has 
generated serious social and economic problems, such that a ‘conundrum’ appears to 
have become a gender crisis.  Iranian women are currently grappling with serious 
issues of unemployment and unaffordable housing.  This has generated conditions of 
poverty, and widespread ancillary problems such as family breakdown, prostitution, 
and drug addiction. 9   According to a United Kingdom based non-governmental 
organisation, Association of Iranian Women in the UK, unemployment and poverty 
(clearly two interrelated issues) are the leading causes of why disturbing numbers of 
Iranian women turn to prostitution as a means of subsistence.10  Suicide rates in Iran 
are also revealing of the reality of Iran’s gender crisis.  A study conducted in June 
2005 found that the majority of suicide attempts in Iran were by young and highly 
educated women.11  In one tragic case in the southern province of Shiraz in 2003, one 
young woman immolated herself after her father forbade her to take up the research 
position that she had won at a local university.12 
 
Examples such as these abound in the Iranian context.  In July 2006, Iranian lawyer, 
women’s rights activist, and Nobel Laureate Shirin Ebadi warned of a ‘tumult where 
everyone will lose’ if the Islamic Republic did not begin to heed the increasing needs 
and desires of the Iranian women, and the population at large.13  This is not an 
entirely new issue in Iran.  The question of the state’s ability and/or political will to 
respond to the changing and increasing needs and demands of its constituency has 
dominated intellectual debates both within and outside of Iran since the late 1990s.  
For Iranian women, there is a specific issue within this debate that remains to be fully 
addressed.  That is, what is at root of Iran’s ‘gender conundrum’, and as such, what is 
the cause of the current gender crisis?  
 
                                                 
6 Mahmood Monshipouri, "The Road to Globalization Runs through Women's Struggle," World Affairs 
167, no. 1 (2004): p. 8. 
7 Human Development Reports, Country Sheet: Islamic Republic of Iran (United Nations Development 
Programme,   [cited October 11 2006]); available from 
http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/countries.cfm?c=IRN. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Moghadam, "Islamic Feminism: Its Discontents and Its Prospects". 
10 Monshipouri, "The Road to Globalization Runs through Women's Struggle," p. 8. 
11 See Mohammad-Reza Mohammadi et al., "Suicidal Attempt and Psychiatric Disorders in Iran," 
Suicide & Life - Threatening Behaviour 35, no. 3 (2005): pp. 309-14. 
12 "Special Report: Shorn of Dignity and Equality - Women in Iran," The Economist 369, no. 8346 
(2003): p. 26. 
13 Shirin Ebadi, "Keynote Address by Shirin Ebadi, Nobel Peace Laureate and Human Rights Activist," 
in Earth Dialogues, Session 4:  Innovation and Inspiration (Brisbane, Australia: 2006). 
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Islamic Feminism and the Iranian Reform Movement 
 
According to some Iranian women, addressing the gender conundrum is essentially a 
theological challenge.  Widely referred to as ‘Islamic feminists’, these women 
contend that Iranian women’s problems are a result of misguided male interpretations 
of Islam’s holy texts, as opposed to the principles of Islam itself.  Islamic feminists 
believe that the chasm between the state’s existing gender ideology, and the reality of 
women’s lives, can be closed vis-à-vis woman-centred re-readings of Islam’s holy 
sources.  The notion of ijtihad – which remains alive in the Shi’ite tradition – is a 
driving force of the Islamic feminist project.  Ijtihad allows for intellectual 
(re)interpretation and innovation of Islam’s holy sources.  Specifically, ijtihad 
involves the application of human reason to the Sharia’h legal code, in order to 
ascertain whether or not certain injunctions are applicable or suitable to modern 
situations.   
 
In this sense, Islamic feminists are closely tied to religious intellectualism in Islam. 14  
Islamic feminists accept the legitimacy of the project of political Islam.  Building a 
state to uphold and promote Islam is part and parcel of Islamic feminism as it 
considers the attainment of Muslim women’s rights and dignity to be only possible in 
the context of a truly Islamic state.  As a consequence, Islamic feminism has proven 
to be a flourishing force as it does not challenge the Iranian regime, but confines itself 
to targeting aspects of state policy that are deemed to be deviating from Islam.  
Islamic feminism gained wide appeal in the late 1990s against the background of 
President Muhammad Khatami’s reform agenda. 
 
In May 1997 the liberal cleric Muhammad Khatami won a landslide victory at Iran’s 
election polls.  As leader of the reform movement and president of the Islamic 
Republic, Khatami represented the nation’s number one hope for meaningful change.  
Khatami was loyal to the original religio-revolutionary ideals of the Islamic Republic.  
However, he sought to convince the clerical leadership that for the regime to remain 
vital, it would have to protect the basic needs, rights, and freedoms of its 
constituency.  This enterprise need not necessitate regime overhaul; rather, it could be 
achieved vis-à-vis an internal process of reform.  Khatami relied on a pragmatic 
interpretation of Islam’s scared texts in order to justify his proposals for change to the 
ulama.  Khatami’s politics appealed to the Iranian nation at large as he favoured 
pluralistic Islam as opposed to the dogmatic religious rhetoric of his counterparts.15 
The reform movement, which was presented in the spirit of ijtihad, presented Islamic 
feminists with an obvious tactical and strategic partner. 16 
 
Iranian women afforded the reform movement a vital base of support.  Their 
conviction was that ‘under his [Khatami’s] presidency women’s issues could be 
                                                 
14 New Religious Thought and Feminism: An Interview with Alireza Alavitabar (Bad Jens:  Iranian 
Feminist Newsletter,  March 2003 [cited September 12 2006]); available from 
www.badjens.com/alireza.html. 
15 Elaheh Koolaee, "The Prospects for Democracy: Women Reformists in the Iranian Parliament," in 
On Shifting Ground, Muslim Women in the Global Era, ed. Fereshteh Nouraie-Simone (New York: 
The Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2005), p. 203. 
16 See Moghadam, "Islamic Feminism: Its Discontents and Its Prospects", Valentine M. Moghadam, 
"Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents: Toward a Resolution of the Debate," Signs 27, no. 4 (2002): p. 
1138. 
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fought for more easily’ than under the conservative candidate Nateghe Nouri.17  This 
conviction looked set to manifest with the election of a reformist-dominated 
parliament in 2000.  Thirteen reform-minded women were elected as members of the 
Sixth Majlis.  These women formed a bloc that came to be referred to as the Women’s 
Faction.18  Like President Khatami, the Women’s Faction expressed loyalty to the 
Islamic Revolution; they did not question the concept of the divinely-mandated 
Islamic state.  However, members of the Women’s Faction lamented the ‘gap between 
the ideals of the Islamic Republic and the reality of women’s rights and status.’19  For 
these women, the root cause of the gap between Iran’s revolutionary promises and the 
state’s laws and policies on women was not the Iranian-Islamic state system itself. 
According to one member of the Women’s Faction, Elaheh Koolaee, the problem for 
Iranian women derived from ‘the influence of traditional Islam,’ over the state’s 
conservative forces.20 
 
Consequently, the Women’s Faction conceived of an appropriate challenge to these 
conservative forces that came ‘from within the Islamic framework by relying on the 
progressive teachings of Ayatollah Khomeini and the principles of the Islamic 
constitution.’21  Thus, the Women’s Faction set out to improve Iranian women’s 
conditions by altering and amending existing legislation.  This approach aimed to 
temper the severity and impact of patriarchal laws on Iranian women’s lives.  It was a 
strategy that met with some success.  The Women’s Faction managed to convince the 
establishment to allow single women to travel abroad to study.22  Their lobbying also 
contributed to an amendment of the custody law to allow women automatic custody 
of both boy and girl-children until seven years of age (prior to this women had 
custody of boys only until they were two years of age, at which point full custody 
rights devolved to the father).23  Additionally, the Women’s Faction was successful in 
raising the minimum legal age for girls to marry from nine to thirteen.  As Mahmood 
Monshipouri has noted, ‘this is perhaps not what lawyers and activists wanted, which 
was increasing the puberty age to eighteen, but it nevertheless is an improvement over 
past laws.’24 
 
These changes are important.  They suggest that Islamic feminist strategies may go 
some way in generating improvements for Iranian women.  However, the weight of 
these ‘success stories’ must be analysed in the larger context of the reform 
movement’s seven-year tenure under President Khatami, along with the state’s policy 
reversals in the post-reform era.  Notwithstanding the above examples, and despite 
putting up a long and hard battle, the Women’s Faction did not succeed in producing 
substantive and lasting changes to the status of women in Iranian society.  The 
possibility that they might do so rested predominantly on the extent to which the 
ulama was willing to incrementally yield their orthodox reading of Islam to the more 
                                                 
17 Elaheh Rostami Povey, "Feminist Contestations of Institutional Domains in Iran," Feminist Review 
69 (2001): p. 49. 
18 Koolaee, "Prospects for Democracy," p. 205. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Mehrangiz Kar, "Women and Civil Society in Iran," in On Shifting Ground, Muslim Women in the 
Global Era, ed. Fereshteh Nouraie-Simone (New York: The Feminist Press at the City University of 
New York, 2005), p. 225. 
23 Koolaee, "Prospects for Democracy," p. 210. 
24 Monshipouri, "The Road to Globalization Runs through Women's Struggle," p. 5. 
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enlightened version of the faith proffered by Khatami and his backers.  This prospect 
proved to be a non-event.  Although reformist parliamentarians dominated the Majlis 
during the reform era, the conservative-dominated Guardian Council repeatedly 
exercised its veto power to block legislation that would cause any consequential 
change to the status quo.  At root of this political impasse between reformists and 
conservatives was the Iranian-Islamic principle of velayate faqih: governance of the 
most learned Islamic scholar. 25   This principle accords the ulama a privileged role in 
governing the Islamic state, and ensures that the Supreme Leader has the ‘final say’.  
It effectively relegates other branches of the government, including the parliament, to 
function as optional extras to a predetermined political agenda. 
 
Some observers have argued that even when laws to protect women’s rights were 
adopted, the Guardian Council ensured that they were ‘emptied of their progressive 
content.’26  For example, the amendment to Article 1210 of the Iranian civil code – 
which raised the minimum legal age for girls to marry from nine to thirteen – was 
only approved by the Guardian Council on the condition that an additional clause be 
added to the civil code.  The addendum states that the marriage of girls before the age 
of thirteen is allowed if the girl’s guardian, along with either a judge or medical 
practitioner ‘considered that the girl was ready for marriage.’27  In effect, the addition 
of this clause renders the lawful application of Article 1210 non-compulsory.28  In any 
case, the Guardian Council in fact forthrightly rejected the majority of bills proposed 
by the Women’s Faction during the reform era.  Importantly, in 2003 one of these 
bills included a proposal for the Iranian state to ratify the United Nations’ Convention 
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).  
Although the Parliament collectively voted in favour of ratifying CEDAW, the 
Guardian Council refused to take up the issue, claiming that CEDAW was both 
‘unconstitutional’ and ‘un-Islamic’. 29   
 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic effectively stipulates that women’s rights 
should be governed by the state’s official interpretation of Islamic law. 30   Article 20 
states that men and women should ‘enjoy equal protection of the law…in conformity 
with Islamic criteria.’  Similarly, Article 21 stipulates that ‘the government must 
ensure the rights of women in all respects, in conformity with Islamic criteria.’ 31  
Thus, the central question for the Women’s Faction during the debate over CEDAW 
was on exactly what basis does the Guardian Council decide whether or not a bill 
designed to improve women’s status is ‘Islamic’ or ‘un-Islamic’?  In order to justify 
                                                 
25 For a more comprehensive account of the power structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran, see 
Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Where Is the Islamic Republic of Iran Heading?," Australian Journal of 
International Affairs 59, no. 1 (2005): pp. 25-38. 
26 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Fatemah Haqiqatjoo and the Sixth Majlis: A Woman in Her Own Right (Middle 
East Report Online,   [cited September 28 2006]); available from www.merip.org/mer/mer233/mir-
hosseini.html  
27 Soraya Tremayne, "Modernity and Early Marriage in Iran: A View from Within," Journal of Middle 
East Women's Studies 2, no. 1 (2006). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ali Akbar Dareini, Iran Parliament Provokes Opposition (The Associated Press,  2003 [cited August 
30 2006]); available from www.wwrn.org/article.php?idd=6554&sec=59&con=33. 
30  Mahsa Shekarloo, Iran: Iranian Women Take on the Constitution (Women Living Under Muslim 
Laws,  August 7, 2005 [cited July 31 2006]); available from 
www.wluml.org/english/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B157%5D=x-157-290357. 
31 Islamic Republic of Iran Constitution ([cited August 1 2006]); available from 
www.iranonline/iran/iran-info/Government/constitution.html.  Emphasis added. 
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its rejection of CEDAW, the Guardian Council presented the case in Islamic terms, by 
invoking the state’s official religious gender ideology: specifically, the traditional 
Islamic concepts of gender equity and a ‘balance’ of rights (in contrast to the notions 
of gender equality and equal rights embodied in international law). 32   What is crucial 
to bear in mind here is that the Women’s Faction did not present the case for CEDAW 
in secular terms.  To the contrary, they were careful to stress the compatibility of 
CEDAW and Islam, by invoking such Islamic ideals as egalitarianism and 
humanitarianism.  Thus, senior Islamic clerics were located on both sides of the 
debate over CEDAW: ‘this was not a case of secularists facing off against those 
upholding Islamic principles.’33 
 
The Guardian Council’s rejection of the parliamentary push to ratify and adopt 
CEDAW revealed a major problem for the reformist camp, including Islamic 
feminists.  By arguing that CEDAW was compatible with the essence of Islam, 
Islamic feminists had revealed their vulnerability in contesting proclamations that 
drew on more traditional and conservative readings of Islam.  The chosen framework 
within which Islamic feminism operated was severely restricted.  Nowhere was this 
more salient than in the parliament.  There are 290 seats in the Iranian Majlis.  In 
2000, reformists won 170 of these seats.  Of these 13 were allocated to women: this 
represents less than five percent of the total seats in parliament.  According to the 
United Nations’ gender empowerment measure, the average number of seats held by 
women in parliament (as a percentage of the total) in all developing countries in the 
year 2000 was 13.6 percent.  In the more specific category of South Asia (in which 
Iran was included), the same figure came out as 8.8 percent.  In sum, the presence of 
thirteen women in the Majlis meant that Iran was included in the ‘low human 
development’ category for the percentage of total seats in parliament held by women 
(this category included all countries where the participation of women in parliament 
as a percentage of the total was less than 9.2 percent).34 
 
Quite aside from these figures, the numerical presence of Iranian women in the Majlis 
during the reform era fails to indicate the second-rate, discriminatory conditions in 
which these women were forced to operate.  In her recently published memoir, Shirin 
Ebadi recounts her visit to the separate women’s quarters of parliament in 2003.  
Ebadi’s description is worth quoting at length, as she highlights the importance of 
looking behind statistical measures to assess any improvement of women’s status in 
Iran.  Acknowledging the efforts and symbolic significance of women in the Sixth 
Majlis, Ebadi recalls her to dismay when she realised that: 
 
…the women had no place to sit.  Literally, they had no chairs.  You would think if they could 
get themselves elected to parliament in the Islamic Republic, they might have been able to 
arrange for some chairs.  Or at least complain publicly over the awkwardness of their seating 
in legislature.  They did neither…their chamber didn’t even have a door, just a curtain…Here 
we were in parliament, inside the very halls where women were supposed to legislate and 
change the conditions outside for millions and millions of women, and they couldn’t even 
                                                 
32 Shekarloo, Iranian Women Take on the Constitution. 
33 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "The Reformulation of Islamic Thought on Gender Rights and Roles," in 
Workshop on Islam and Human Rights (Waterview Function Centre, Melbourne, Australia: The Centre 
for Muslim Minorities and Islam Policy Studies, Monash University, 2006). 
34 Human Development Report 2000 "Human Rights and Human Development" (United Nations,   
[cited September 27 2006]); available from http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2000/en/. 
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secure themselves a table.  What can you accomplish in society at large when this is all you 
have achieved inside the institution itself?35 
 
Ebadi’s final question here is distressing.  It indicates that participation or entry into 
the Islamic state – on the grounds that one is ideologically ‘acceptable’ – is not a 
natural precursor, and nor is it paramount to, removing the patriarchal biases of that 
system.  The Guardian Council repeatedly quashed bills that were intended to 
improve women’s status within the confines of the Islamic state, despite the fact that 
these bills were justified by reformists by recourse to a liberal interpretation of Islam.  
This raised fundamental questions about the ability of the Islamic state to 
accommodate meaningful change.  This manifest inability is not merely an 
unintended symptom of the Islamic state.  Rather, it is enshrined in Iran’s constitution 
and named in the appellation velayate faqih:  by recourse to this principle, resistance 
to change is an inherent political function of the Islamic state system. As a result, 
Iran’s women parliamentarians were faced with an existential crisis: these women 
were ideologically grounded within the constitutional boundaries of the Islamic state.  
By participating in and working according to the rules of the Islamic Republic, did the 
Women’s Faction simply lend legitimacy to a politically bereft and systemically 
patriarchal establishment? 
 
 
Islamic Feminists and Secular Feminists:  A United Front 
 
In April 2000 a cohort of intellectuals, journalists, activists and reformists gathered in 
Berlin to discuss the future direction of the reform movement in Iran.  The Berlin 
Conference was approved by the Islamic authorities, but later deemed ‘un-Islamic’ as 
a result of agitation by Iranian opposition activists in exile.  Ten reformists were 
subsequently charged with ‘acting out against the internal security of the state and 
disparaging the holy order of the Islamic Republic.’36  As the state meted out 
punishments to conference participants, it became obvious that secular-oriented 
women activists were being dealt with more harshly than their Islamic counterparts.  
During the conference, two leading secular activists– lawyer Mehrangiz Kar and 
publisher Shahla Lahiji – had criticized the slow process of the reform movement and 
argued that religious domination over civil law was a serious threat to women’s 
human rights.37  After their return to Iran, these women were subjected to closed-door 
trials and spent two months in prison.  In contrast, Islamic feminists who had 
participated in the conference, such as Shahla Sherkat (editor of the Islamic feminist 
magazine, Zanan) were accorded public trials and faced fines but successfully 
appealed their prison sentences. 
 
According to a number of commentators, the harsh penalties dealt out to secular 
women in the aftermath of the Berlin Conference was a broad human rights issue 
pertaining to the Islamic state’s treatment of women at large, rather than a one-off 
result of these women’s participation in a conference-gone-wrong.38  As a result, 
                                                 
35 Shirin Ebadi, Iran Awakening, a Memoir of Revolution and Hope (New York: Random House, 
2006), pp. 185-86. 
36 Nikkie R. Keddie, “Introduction” in Gary Sick, Nikkie R. Keddie, and Azita Karimkhany, "Women 
in Iran: An Online Discussion," Middle East Policy 8, no. 4 (2001): p. 129. 
37 Povey, "Feminist Contestations of Institutional Domains in Iran," p. 66. 
38 See for example Ann Elizabeth Mayer, “Gulf /2000 Disucssion” in Sick, Keddie, and Karimkhany, 
"Women in Iran," p. 132. 
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secular-oriented women felt that their treatment at the hands of the state following the 
Berlin Conference merited condemnation by Islamic feminists.  However, Islamic 
feminists declined to display overt support for their imprisoned sisters.  This may 
have been an issue of practicality and political expedience.  In order to avoid 
developing a confrontational relationship with the state (and hence continue their 
activities), Islamic feminists were induced to refrain from supporting women who had 
expressed outright dissent against the Islamic state. 
 
This schism went to the heart of the divide between the feminist camps.  Islamic 
feminists were ultimately committed to upholding Islam as the solution to the plight 
of Iranian women.  The Islamic state, in its idealised form, was integral to this vision.  
This was a concern that induced Islamic feminists to refrain from openly campaigning 
for their arrested sisters.  Yet it was precisely these women whose human rights 
needed urgent attention.  Thus, the experience of the Berlin Conference went some 
way in highlighting the limitations of the Islamic feminist project.  Specifically, it 
raised questions regarding the extent to which Islamic feminists can assist the cause of 
women who, like them, work towards ending discrimination against women, but 
unlike them, are ideologically ‘unacceptable’ in the eyes of the state. 
 
Secular feminism in Iran, espoused by activists such as Kar and Lahiji, represents an 
alternative to Islamic feminism.  This alternative view is not Islamocentric.  It does 
not apportion to Islam the grave responsibility of solving women’s problems in Iran.  
In fact, secular feminists view the merging of Islam and politics as a central part of 
the problem that Iranian women face.  Addressing women’s issue, therefore, is seen to 
depend to a very large extent on the separation of the state and its legal codes from 
Islam.  As far as secular feminists are concerned, the disjuncture between the state’s 
gender ideology and Iranian women’s lives has little to do with theology and 
everything to do with the idea and power structure of the Islamic state.  Consequently, 
the denial of women’s rights in Iran is an issue of state repression and elitist refusal to 
accept any alternatives to the established status quo.  The fact that any move for 
reform and improvement of women’s conditions in Iran need to be formulated in the 
language of Islam and justified with reference to Islamic concepts – however liberally 
interpreted – makes these moves hostage to a set of ideas and principles that are 
grounded in the experience of seventh century Arabia.  Therefore, secular feminists 
insist that the struggle for women’s rights within Iran must move beyond religious 
discourse, and come from outside the official state establishment.  
 
Despite the ideological divergence between Iran’s two feminist camps – and the 
consequent course of events following the Berlin Conference –Islamic feminists and 
secular feminists have a history of cooperation.  Since the early 1990s, these women 
have tended to coalesce around individual issues.  The women’s press has played a 
key role in this respect, by providing a forum for debate and discussion. Secular 
feminists such as Mehrangiz Kar have often been invited to make contributions to the 
Islamic feminist magazine, Zanan.  As editor of the magazine, Shahla Sherkat has 
argued that ‘women’s issues in Iran are so complicated that we [Islamic feminists and 
secular feminists alike] must start from somewhere we could agree with each other 
and work through until we arrive at areas of disagreement.’39  The record of 
collaborative efforts between Islamic feminists and secular feminists was in stark 
                                                 
39 Povey, "Feminist Contestations of Institutional Domains in Iran," p. 62. 
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contrast to the post-Berlin divergence.  According to Islamic feminist and author Lily 
Farhadpour, during this time both Islamic and secular women activists began to 
question whether or not Iranian women could afford to allow a division along 
religious/secular lines to crystalise in the post-Berlin political climate.  Farhadpour 
did not think so.40 
 
Farhadpour embarked on a series of comprehensive interviews with both Islamic and 
secular feminists to produce the book Zanan-e Berlin (Women of Berlin).  According 
to the book’s publisher, Mahmoubeh Abbas-Gholizadeh (Islamic feminist and editor 
of the Islamic feminist magazine Farzaneh), Zanan-e Berlin sought to demonstrate 
that ‘through a realistic and objective analysis it is possible and it is necessary to fill 
the gap between the different forms of feminism in Iran.’ 41  Interestingly, the way 
that this gap has been filled since 2000 has not been entirely even-handed.  Rather, 
contemporary cross-ideological feminist cooperation in Iran appears to be 
increasingly characterised by a secular feminist tilt.  According to Valentine 
Mogahadam, during the later stages of the reform era in the early 2000s, Abbas-
Gholizadeh became increasingly willing to criticise ‘herself and other Islamist women 
for the long rift they had with secular women, and she has urged unity over the critical 
issues facing Iran’s women.’  Elaheh Rostami Povey noted an example of the shape 
that this unity was taking when she conducted a series of interviews in Iran in 2001: 
 
[Now], both religious and secular women agree with each other that men should not be 
allowed to marry four wives and an unlimited number of temporary wives, as is suggested by 
the Sharia’h.  In the 1970s, under the secular state of Pahlavi, when secular women raised the 
same issue, many religious women’s response was that this is a religious issue and is not the 
concern of non-believers.  In 2001 many religious women argue that this law does not apply 
to today’s Iranian society.42 
 
In the concluding remarks of her study, Povey noted that ‘secular feminism is getting 
its strength back and is challenging…[Islamic] feminism and the limitation of the 
Islamic state and institutions on gender issues – the limitation of the reforms and the 
feminist reading of the Sharia’h.’43  Similarly, at the first International Congress on 
Islamic Feminism (held in Barcelona, October 2005), Moghadam offered her opinion 
that framing demands for women’s rights in Iran within secular discourse is an 
approach that ‘will soon be adopted by Islamic feminists, too.  This is because their 
project of reinterpreting Islam and challenging patriarchy cannot be realised within 
the theocratic framework currently in place in the Islamic Republic of Iran.’44  In this 
statement Moghadam was not necessarily questioning the legitimacy of Islamic 
feminist’s woman-friendly readings of Islam’s holy sources.  Rather, she was pointing 
to the fact that the denial of women’s rights in Iran is a political issue that derives 
from the power structure of the Islamic state.  As such, Moghadam was questioning 
the relevance of Islamic feminism in the Iranian theocracy. 
 
 
                                                 
40 Mahsa Shekarloo, Government Newspaper?  What Government Newspaper?  An Interview with 
Journalist Lily Farhadpour (Bad Jens, Iranian Feminist Newspaper,  November 21, 2000, Fourth 
Edition [cited October 15 2006]); available from www.badjens.com/fourthedition/farhadpour.htm. 
41 Povey, "Feminist Contestations of Institutional Domains in Iran," p. 67. 
42 Ibid.: p. 57. 
43 Ibid.: p. 69. 
44 Moghadam, "Islamic Feminism: Its Discontents and Its Prospects". 
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Secular Feminism in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 
Implementing reform from within reached a dead end in 2004.  High expectations for 
incremental change in Iran while remaining faithful to Islam and the guiding 
principles of the revolution were quashed by the reality of the power structure in the 
Islamic Republic.  In the lead up to the 2004 legislative elections, the Guardian 
Council disqualified one third of the 8, 200 individuals who filed papers to run as 
candidates.45  The ideological vetting of candidates by the Guardian Council left a list 
of conservative candidates with no strong ties to the reform movement.  
Subsequently, Iranian women braced themselves for a contraction of the public space 
that had been laboriously opened up to them during the early years of the reform era.  
According to Mahsa Shekarloo, a member of the non-governmental Women’s 
Cultural Centre in Tehran, by 2004 Iranian women ‘felt they could take only cold 
comfort in the record of the reform era.’46 
 
Interestingly, the seeming futility of working for women’s rights within a state whose 
highest powers were explicit in their disregard for that issue was made strikingly clear 
by one of the Women’s Faction’s most outspoken members, Fatemah Haqiqatjoo.  On 
February 23, 2004, Haqiqatjoo announced her formal resignation from parliament in 
protest against the Guardian Council’s disqualification of candidates from the 
legislative elections.  In a speech to an open session of parliament on the day of her 
resignation, Haqiqatjoo explained her view that reform from within the state system 
was no longer possible.47  She referred to the oath that all elected parliamentarians 
must take when they are sworn into the Majlis.  This oath requires MPs to ‘remain 
faithful to Islam and the constitution, to defend the independence and the interests of 
the country, and to serve the people.’48  Haqiqatjoo stated that ‘since the possibility of 
keeping my oath has been taken from me and I have been deprived of [the ability to] 
defend your legal rights, it is no longer a source of pride for me to stay in this 
house.’49  Haqiatjoo’s resignation speech reflected the sentiments of women and the 
Iranian populace at large.  In October 2003, Shirin Ebadi told the Iran Times that: 
‘President Khatami has wasted all the historical chances given him, and the domestic 
reform movements have passed him by.’50  In fact, since as early as late 1999 
significant portions of the Iranian constituency have demonstrated a lack of support 
for the reformist strategy of pushing the Islamic Republic along a moderate trajectory. 
 
Like Haqiqatjoo, many Iranian women have chosen to opt-out of the official political 
processes of the Islamic state.51  A vast majority of eligible voters chose to boycott 
the 2004 legislative elections.  Their view was that non-participation in the elections 
would be the best way to de-legitimise the entire process.  The result for women’s 
representation was predictable.  Thirteen women were elected as members of the 
Seventh Majlis. However, unlike their reform-minded predecessors, twelve of these 
                                                 
45 Monshipouri, "The Road to Globalization Runs through Women's Struggle," p. 6. 
46 Shekarloo, Iranian Women Take on the Constitution. 
47 Mir-Hosseini, Fatemah Haqiqatjoo and the Sixth Majlis. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Jahangir Amuzegar, "Khatami: A Folk Hero in Search of Relevance," Middle East Policy XI, no. 2 
(2004): p. 81. 
51 The Changing Face of Iran (August 19, 2006 [cited August 23 2006]); available from 
www.smh.com.au/news.world/the-changing-face-of-
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women were conservative (and one independent).52  According to Kar, the women’s 
members of Iran’s current parliament ‘aspire to limit the achievements of their 
predecessors and have moved in the opposite direction of the women deputies of the 
Sixth Parliament.’53  For example, women in the Seventh Majlis have actively 
opposed the bill (which remained on the agenda of parliament at the closing of the 
Sixth Majlis) regarding Iran’s joining of CEDAW. 54  Unlike their reformist 
predecessors, women in the Seventh Majlis have demonstrated compliance with the 
state’s official gender ideology.  The emphasis on the primacy of the private domain, 
as opposed to the public arena, for Iranian women was formulated by Fatemah Aliya, 
a member of the current parliament.  According to Aliya, the Seventh Majlis ‘will try 
to grow women according to the framework specified by God…If fulfilling her social 
duties causes an interruption in her individual and family obligations, this shall 
constitute oppression to the woman.’55 
 
As a consequence of this traditional Islamist stance, since the instatement of the 
Seventh Majlis in 2004 the few gains made by Islamic feminists during the reform era 
have proved to be largely inconsequential.  Thus, an important issue for secular 
feminists in post-reform Iran is not only the fact that women in the Seventh Majlis 
have abandoned the reformist impulses of the Women’s Faction, but rather, just how 
easy it has been for them to do so.  When a 21-year old female student from Tehran 
University discussed her decision not to vote in the 2004 parliamentary elections with 
Iranian lawyer and journalist Shadi Sadr, she pointed to that fact that ‘there was no 
candidate left that I could vote for.’56  However, this young woman added an 
extremely revealing point: she told Sadr that even if reformist women candidates were 
allowed to run in the 2004 elections, it would still have been futile to vote because no 
female member of parliament ‘could have done anything under this system!’57  As 
such, 2004 marked a strategic watershed for Iranian women activists: this ‘was [a] 
time to assess past activities and future prospects.’58  
 
The demise of the reform movement in 2004 marked a move away from Islamic 
feminism for many Iranian women.  The latter have ceased to focus primarily on what 
room for movement there may be for women in the legislature and judiciary.  Rather, 
Iranian women have increasingly employed secular feminist tactics, taking their 
issues directly to the public through public protests and acts of civil disobedience. For 
example, young Iranian women have increasingly engaged in deliberate bad-hejabi: 
improper wearing of the Islamic veil.  This involves letting hair show at the front and 
sides of the veil, or wearing remarkably bright colours and patterns.  This is not 
simply a matter of fashion.  Rather, bad-hejabi is a symbol of young Iranian women’s 
increasing desire to live in a society where there is more cultural opening, and where 
individual choice is valued and respected.  In this respect, the following statement 
from a 25-year-old university student is instructive: 
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54 Ibid. 
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Because of these (conservative) people and their aggressive thinking, I believe I am vulnerable to 
attack if I don’t wear the hijab…if I was living in a place where people could respect individual 
choice and not do me any harm, certainly I wouldn’t wear it…I want to show I don’t approve 
of…[the establishment].  If I stay here and resist, I can prove it to myself and prove it to others.59 
 
The resistance that this young woman speaks of has also taken place on more formal 
levels.  On June 12, 2005, Iranian women staged a sit-in at Tehran University to 
protest the Guardian Council’s blatant disregard for democracy in the lead up to the 
presidential elections that year.  In a repeat of its actions eighteen months earlier, the 
Guardian Council had disqualified all presidential candidates that it deemed to be 
ideologically ‘unacceptable.’  Importantly, the organisers of the women’s sit-in did 
not only gather to demand a reinstatement of disqualified presidential candidates.  
Rather, these women called for a referendum to revise the entire Iranian constitution.  
The official statement of the sit-in drew a direct link between the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic and ‘women’s belittlement’.  The statement referred to the 
Constitution as a fundamental block to women’s abilities to secure their rights. 60   
 
The above movement presents an affront to the traditional Islamist women in Iran’s 
Seventh Majlis.  More importantly, this movement parts company from reformist 
Islamic groups.  It was notable that the Islamic feminists who had formed the 
Women’s Faction in Iran’s Sixth Majlis were markedly absent from the June 12 sit-
in.61  The women’s movement in Iran is increasingly distancing itself from Islamic 
feminism as it is seen as part of the problem, not the solution.  The ineffectiveness of 
Islamic feminism to achieve change and its unwillingness to challenge the Islamic 
state are now seen by the assertive women’s movement in Iran as major 
shortcomings.  The plummeting of reformists’ fortune was the most revealing 
experience – demonstrating how easy it is to lose overnight any rights and freedoms 
that might have been negotiated under the Islamic regime.  This disillusionment with 
Islamic feminism was most evident in 2006.  On June 12, 2006 Iranian women 
gathered to commemorate and expand on their demands from one year earlier.  This 
time, Islamic feminists were not simply voluntarily absent from the protest.  Rather, 
according to Mir-Hosseini, the participants at the 2006 sit-in explicitly identified 
themselves as ‘secular feminists’ and made ‘a conscious effort to avoid any 
engagement either with religious arguments or with “Islamic feminists”.’ 62 
 
It is significant that one of Iran’s most renowned and respected women’s rights 
activists, Shirin Ebadi, aligned herself with the secular feminists at the June 2006 sit-
in. Before the protest even had a chance to get off the ground, state-security forces 
beat the women badly.  Scores of women were taken for interrogation and seventy 
people in total were arrested.63  At the request of the organisers of the protest, Ebadi 
opened up a legal case on their behalf against the state.64  This was by no means the 
first time that Ebadi chose to represent and defend political dissidents against the 
state.  Since the early 1990s, Ebadi has taken on a number of the most controversial 
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court cases in Iran.  For example, she acted as defence lawyer for secular feminists 
Mehrangiz Kar and Shahla Lahiji after they were imprisoned following the Berlin 
Conference in 2000.65  Ebadi also represented journalist Akbar Ganji – one of Iran’s 
most outspoken critics of the state – for six years beginning in 2000.  In 2002, Ganji 
wrote his Manifesto for Republicanism from inside the walls of Iran’s notorious Evin 
prison.  The manifesto calls for an end to clerical rule in Iran, and declares the current 
religious establishment illegitimate and unreformable.66 
 
By defending some of Iran’s most prominent political dissidents, Ebadi has not only 
put her own life at very real risk; she has also highlighted the reality that in terms of 
assuring the basic rights and freedoms of its citizens, the politico-legal structure of the 
Islamic Republic is seriously flawed.  It follows that Ebadi is a staunch proponent of 
the separation of mosque and state.67  Such a viewpoint is not meant to suggest that 
Islam is incompatible with democracy, human rights, and gender equality (Ebadi is a 
devoted Muslim).  Rather, Ebadi’s secular brand of feminism deals with a reality that 
goes beyond the Iranian context: when religion is given a formal role to play in the 
political arena, religious texts make powerful and oftentimes easy tools with which to 
ostensibly justify undemocratic practices, human rights abuses, and gender 
discrimination.  
 
Secular feminism has clearly shifted away from Islamic feminism.  Ebadi has argued 
that striving to derive inalienable human rights from Islamic text in a regime governed 
by Islam is a questionable exercise.  In her recently published memoir, Ebadi subjects 
the driving force of Islamic feminism and the reform movement to serious critical 
scrutiny: 
 
Ijtihad frees us by removing the burden of definitiveness – we can interpret and reinterpret 
Koranic teachings forever; but it also means [that]…it is possible for everyone, always, to have a 
point.  It means that patriarchal men and powerful authoritarian regimes who repress in the name 
of Islam can exploit ijtihad to interpret Islam in the regressive, unforgiving manner that suits their 
sensibilities and political agendas….This does not mean that Islam and equal rights for men and 
women are incompatible; it means that invoking Islam in a theocracy refracts the religion through 
a kaleidoscope, with interpretations perpetually shifting and mingling and the vantage of the most 
powerful prevailing.68 
 
Ebadi raises a key point in the above extract: the issue of power and statist repression.  
Islamic feminists in the Sixth Majlis (along with the reform-movement at large) were 
unable to affect the world view of those in Iran’s highest echelons of command.  That 
was because this world view was derived from an entrenched culture of patriarchy, as 
opposed to the transcendental spiritual message Islam itself.  Patriarchy is a political 
issue. During the reform era, the theocratic state demonstrated a lack of concern for, 
or active unwillingness to address, women’s problems regardless of whether such 
issues were framed in Islamic terms or not.  It is for this reason that Iranian women 
have leaned towards secular feminist strategies in post-reform Iran.  The fight for 
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women’s rights has moved outside of state-bound politics and beyond religious 
discourse. 
Conclusion 
 
Iranian women have presented a difficult challenge to the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
After a quarter of a century of Islamic rule, women continue to push the boundaries of 
acceptability set by the state. Whether it is dress code or public visibility, Iranian 
women do not live within the prescribed confines set for them. This assertive spirit 
has been applauded by the global women’s movement, as women’s self-confidence 
and social pride are key factors in challenging patriarchal traditions and practices. 
Fighting for women’s rights in a state that enshrines legal codes institutionalising 
gender inequality can only succeed on the basis of grass root activism and 
assertiveness of women in their public lives. This fight, however, is suffering from an 
internal division.  The schism between Islamic and secular feminism in Iran mirrors a 
wider schism in society between those who favour reforming the political system and 
those who wish for it to be overhauled. 
 
Islamic feminism has made a notable contribution in highlighting the plight of Iranian 
women. The public debate in women’s magazines and the chamber of the legislature 
challenged some of the most extreme aspects of laws relating women’s status. Islamic 
feminists in the sixth Majlis had set themselves the task of reconciling Islamic law in 
Iran with international expectations and standards on women’s rights. To them, this 
was an attainable objective if the practice and interpretation of Islam was cleansed of 
patriarchal and misogynous traditions and beliefs. This enlightened interpretation of 
Islam informed the Islamic feminists’ position in advocating the adoption of 
CEDAW. In this, Islamic feminists were operating squarely within the constitutional 
bounds of the state, which derives legitimacy from Islam and is justified by constant 
references to the Sharia’h. Islamic feminists did not challenge that framework. 
Instead they embraced it and worked to reform aspects of it that they viewed as 
unacceptable. However, what had seemed to be a point of strength in the Islamic 
feminists’ doctrine ultimately proved to be their Achilles’ Heel.   
 
The rejection of CEDAW by the Guardian Council, which vets legislation, and the 
supremacy of the conservative leadership with the election of Ahmadinejad to the 
presidency, were major setbacks for Islamic feminists. The Islamic state and its multi-
layered institutions are governed by a specific reading of Islam to justify the velayate 
faqih, and cannot afford to allow competing interpretations to challenge it. This is an 
existential matter for the state, which explains why reform in general, and Islamic 
feminism in particular, have been resisted.   
 
Iranian women are growingly disillusioned with Islamic feminism as it has proven 
unable to achieve lasting change. Public displays of discontent with the state’s gender 
policy are increasingly expressed in secular terms. The solution to the plight of 
Iranian women is no longer seen in Islam but in the separation of the state and its 
legal codes from Islam. Secular feminists in Iran face a daunting challenge as the very 
idea of separating Islam and politics is anathema to the founding doctrine of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. This political framework ties the future of women’s rights in 
Iran closely with the broader political process that steer Iran in the 21st Century.  
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